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Abstract
A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang (2005) on strategic in-
formation transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more infor-
mation than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence
that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of
a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we
show in a simple sender-receiver game that subjects incurring in costs to
punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent
quantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after
receiving a deceptive message play, on the aggregate, equilibrium strate-
gies. Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one group
of subjects with preferences for truth-telling and one taking into account
only material incentives.
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1 Introduction
Individuals who lie about their private information can obtain a higher payoff
at the costs of others in several situations.1 But by behaving strategically
individuals disrespect one of the oldest ethical principles, a social norm telling
us not to lie. This tension between incentives and normative social behavior
makes it difficult to predict the outcome of this type of interactions. It is our
objective to show, with the help of an experiment, that in situations that can be
modeled as a particularly simple sender-receiver game, a considerable number
of subjects have preferences for truth-telling, whereas the rest of the subjects
follow only material incentives.
Strategic information transmission, introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982),
is an obvious way of modeling the tension described above. In this class of
games, the sender has private information about the true state of the world.
She transmits a message about the actual state to the receiver who takes a
subsequent action that is payoff-relevant for both participants. The main in-
sight of Crawford and Sobel (1982) is that less information about the true state
is transmitted as the preferences of the sender and the receiver become less
aligned.
In the first experimental study on strategic information transmission, Dick-
haut et. al (1995) corroborated this theoretical prediction. More recently,
Gneezy (2005) has shown that if preferences are conflictive (whenever an out-
come is good for the receiver it is bad for the sender and vice versa), then
the probability of lying is increasing in the potential gains to the sender and
decreasing in the potential loss to the receiver. Finally, Cai and Wang (2005)
have offered clear experimental evidence of an overcommunication phenomenon:
Senders truthfully reveal more private information than predicted by the most
informative equilibrium of the standard model of preference maximization. Al-
though the authors explain this abnormality successfully by means of a behav-
ioral type analysis (see among others Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes et. al (2001)
and Crawford (2003)) and the quantal response equilibrium concept (McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995) and (1998)), they leave it as an open question whether the
overcommunication phenomenon is caused by social preferences such as trust
or honesty.
Our aim is to show that the tension between incentives and normative social
behavior is the driving force underlying the overcommunication result. To this
end, we study the experimental behavior of a group of subjects in two very
1Examples include income tax evasion (Alingham and Sandmo (1972)), oligopolistic compe-
tition (Galor (1986)), financial advice (Morgan and Stocken (2003)), and electoral competition
(Heidhues and Lagerlof (2003)).
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similar constant-sum sender-receiver games. The Benchmark Game proceeds
as follows: In the beginning of the game, one out of two payoff tables is randomly
chosen. The selected table determines players’ (strictly positive) payoffs as a
function of the receiver’s action to be taken later on. Then, the sender, who is
the only player informed about Nature’s choice, submits a message about the
actual payoff table. Hence, she implicitly decides whether to tell the truth or
to lie. After observing this message, the receiver takes an action that reveals
whether he trusted or distrusted the sender. Finally, both players are paid
accordingly.
Since the payoff tables are constructed in such a way that the preferences of
the sender and the receiver are completely opposed, the sender does not have
an incentive to transmit any information, or, to say it differently, the sender
plays a strategy such that the posterior beliefs of the receiver remain equal to
the prior beliefs. Given our model specification, only those strategies in which
the sender lies with probability one-half generate these beliefs consistently and
can thus be supported in equilibrium. This action is foreseen correctly by the
receiver, and, as a consequence, random play for both individuals is the only
sequential equilibrium of the Benchmark Game (Proposition 1).
Bounded rationality is one major reason why subjects fail to play equilib-
rium strategies in laboratory experiments. One model of bounded rationality
that has been successfully employed to explain experimental data is the agent
quantal response equilibrium (AQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998). Here
we solve for the logit-AQRE, which is parameterized by λ ∈ [0,∞). Since it is
well known that random play is the unique logit-AQRE for all sequential games
if λ = 0 and every logit-AQRE is also sequential equilibrium when λ tends to
infinity, it is not surprising that random play is the unique logit-AQRE of the
Benchmark Game (Proposition 2).
In the first step of our experimental analysis we show that subjects playing
the Benchmark Game in the role of the sender lie significantly less than pre-
dicted by equilibrium theory (Hypothesis 1). Then, in order to provide evidence
that this result is caused by a considerable number of subjects with preferences
for truth-telling we extend our original set-up. In the Punishment Game, the
receiver is informed about the actual payoff table once he has taken an action.
Finally, he chooses between accepting the payoff distribution induced by the
Benchmark Game and reducing the payoffs of both players to zero.
Whereas rational individuals should never punish the sender (this action is
costly), receivers may do so according to the logit-AQRE concept because it
is assumed that individuals make mistakes when they try to maximize their
payoffs. Yet, the punishment rate must depend only on the payoff the receiver
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foregoes (Proposition 4). On the other hand, the inequity aversion models of
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are also able to ex-
plain the empirical observation that some individuals are willing to pay money
in order to reduce income disparities. Hence, in these models the punishment
rate depends upon the whole payoff distribution. Finally, Brandts and Char-
ness (2003) have recently uncovered an even more complex type of preferences:
Individuals seem not only to take into account the whole payoff distribution,
rather the notion of procedural justice2-the utility attached to a payoff distri-
bution depends on how this distribution has been reached- plays a crucial role
in socio-economic interactions. The authors study in the laboratory a game in
which the sender transmits a message regarding her/his intended play in a 2×2
simultaneous move game and show that the receiver’s willingness to punish the
sender after revealing the result from the simultaneous move game depends on
whether or not the sender played according to the reported message.
We base our predictions for the Punishment Game on the prevalence of the
latter type of preferences and we are able to reject the other two explanations
by looking at the punishment rates after different histories. Since the game is
symmetric, histories can be summarized by whether or not a message is truthful
and whether or not the receiver trusts that message. The punishment rates are
equal to 0% after history (truth,trust), 1.6% after (lie,distrust), 5.4% after
(truth,distrust), and 25.2% after (lie,trust). Since the payoff distribution after
history (truth,distrust) is equal to the one after (lie,trust), we take the difference
in the punishment rates after these histories (lie,trust) and (truth,distrust) as
an estimator for the importance of procedural justice. We confirm that this
difference is significantly greater than zero (Hypothesis 2).
In the next step of our analysis we use the previous results to show that
the excessive truth-telling in the Benchmark Game can be explained in terms
of social preferences for truth-telling or normative social behavior. First, we
use the punishment treatment to identify all subjects with strong concerns
for procedural justice. In particular, we find that 15 out of 66 individuals
punish liars frequently after history (lie,trust). Not surprisingly this group of
individuals punishes the sender in over 81% of all observations after this history
and accounts for 90% of all punishments related to procedural justice. Then,
we study how these subjects behave in the role of the sender. It turns out
that they tell the truth in 70.6% of the occasions whereas the rest of subjects
do so only in 52% (the overall percentage of truth-telling in the Punishment
Game is equal to 56.3% and not significantly different from the corresponding
2The concept of procedural justice has been introduced in decision theory by Sen (1997)
as an extension of the standard model of preference maximization over material outcomes.
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percentage in the Benchmark Game). This result supports our conjecture that
individuals with a strong sense for procedural justice should, consistently, be
responsible for the excessive truth-telling (Hypothesis 3). We refer to this as
morally consistent behavior.
Finally, we ask how robust our results are with respect to an increase in
the inequality of the potential payoff distribution while maintaining incentives
the same. In the particular case we study, the sender can now gain more by
deceiving the receiver if the latter trusts the sender’s message and punishments
hurt the sender more without increasing the associated cost to the receiver. We
observe two main changes (Hypothesis 4): (1) The excessive truth-telling in the
Benchmark Game vanishes, because the senders tell the truth only in 50.6% of
all observations. This finding is consistent with the study of Gneezy (2005) who
observed that the probability of lying is increasing in the potential gains to the
sender. (2) The percentage of punishments after history (lie,trust) increases
from 25% to over 42%. Moreover, since the punishment rate after history
(truth,distrust) raises “only” from 5% to 13%, we conclude that procedural
justice plays now an even more central role. All other results are very robust.
Most importantly, subjects who punish liars frequently after history (lie,trust)
are again responsible for the excessive truth-telling in the Punishment Game
(the overall percentage of truth-telling in this game is now equal to 56.4%).
These subjects tell the truth in 69.8% of all occasions whereas the rest do so
only in 51.1%.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next Section,
we formally introduce the games and our experimental hypotheses. In Section
3, we explain the experimental procedures. Afterwards, we present our results
and perform the robustness analysis. We conclude in Section 5. The proofs of
the Propositions and the instructions of the Punishment Game are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Analysis and Predictions
In this Section, we introduce the Benchmark and the Punishment Game and de-
rive several null hypotheses from the corresponding quantal response equilibria.
Moreover, we present our alternative hypotheses deduced from the incorpora-
tion of preferences for truth-telling.
The Benchmark Game
Let N = {sender,receiver} be the set of players. At the beginning of the
game, Nature picks payoff table A and B with equal probability, e.g. p(A) =
5
p(B) = 0.5. Only the sender is informed about the payoff table actually chosen.
Selecting table θ ∈ Θ = {A,B} means that final payoffs are realized according
to θ. Both tables depend only on the action U or D taken by the receiver later
on. We assume in both tables that x > 1.
Put Table 1 about here (caption: Payoff Tables)
After the sender has been informed, she chooses a mixed strategy with
support on the message spaceM = {A,B}. Formally, if Nature selects table A,
the sender communicates with probability p(A|A) ≡ pA that table A represents
the actual payoff scheme. Thus, she lies in this case with probability p(B|A) =
1− pA. Similarly, if Nature selects table B, she communicates with probability
p(B|B) ≡ 1 − pB that table B represents the actual payoff scheme. Thus, she
lies in this case with probability p(A|B) = pB.
Next, we describe the receiver’s belief system. If m = {A} (the sender
transmits message A), the receiver believes with probability µ(A|A) ≡ µA that
the actual payoff scheme is represented by table A whereas he thinks with
probability µ(B|A) = 1 − µA that table B is the one determining payoffs. If
m = {B}, the receiver believes with probability µ(A|B) ≡ µB that table A
determines payoffs and with probability µ(B|B) = 1 − µB that table B is the
one doing so. Taking into account these beliefs, the receiver chooses a mixed
strategy with support on the action set A = {U,D}. Formally, if m = {A},
the receiver takes action U with probability q(U |A) ≡ qA and action D with
probability q(D|A) = 1−qA. Similarly, if m = {B}, the receiver takes action U
with probability q(U |B) ≡ qB and action D with probability q(D|B) = 1− qB.
Finally, both individuals receive their payoff. We denote by u(a, θ) and v(a, θ)
the payoff of the sender and the receiver when the receiver takes action a ∈ A
and the true state is θ ∈ Θ.
Put Figure 1 about here (caption: The Benchmark Game). The corresponding
graphic file is called figure2.eps and it should be scaled down to about 50%.
The Benchmark Game is well suited to analyze the tension between social
preferences for truth-telling and material incentives for two reasons. First, in
order to minimize the possibility of mistakes made by subjects, the Benchmark
Game has a simple payoff structure and a very intuitive set of equilibria. Second,
truth-telling is a dichotomous choice in the sense that (a) there are only two
state variables and (b) the sender’s strategy set boils down to the messages
truth and lie. This is important, because otherwise a message may contain
a richer meaning. To see this suppose that the state and message space are
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both equal to {1, 2, 3}. In this case individuals do not only tell the truth or lie,
because they also choose a “level” of deceit whenever the true state is {1} or {3}.
Hence, richer state and message spaces give room to a wide variety of behaviors
and to a complexity that lies out of the scope of the paper.3 According to
Proposition 1 the set of sequential equilibria of the Benchmark Game does not
depend on x. Yet, since different values of x give raise to more or less fair payoff
distributions, we are likely to observe an effect in our experimental results. To
take this into account we set x equal to 2 in our first experimental series and
perform afterwards a robustness analysis by considering the case when x is
equal to 9.4
Proposition 1 The set of sequential equilibria of the Benchmark Game is
given by the set of strategies (p∗A, p
∗
B, q
∗
A, q
∗
B) = (p, p, q, q), where p, q ∈ [0, 1],
and the supporting belief system (µ∗A, µ
∗
B) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Proof: See Appendix A. ¤
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows: Since preferences are not aligned,
the sender plays a strategy that leaves the receiver’s prior beliefs unchanged.
The strategies generating these posterior beliefs in a consistent manner are all
those in which the sender submits message A with a constant probability, e.g.
pA = pB = p ∈ [0, 1]. To see this note that if the sender plays for example the
strategy “always transmit message A” (this strategy is equal to pA = pB = 1),
then the receiver does not get any additional information from the message.
Hence, the receiver can as well ignore it. This game becomes thus equivalent
to the following one: Nature selects the tables A and B with equal probability
and the receiver chooses q (the probability to play U) to maximize his expected
payoff. Since the expected payoff is equal to p(A)(q+x(1−q))+p(B)(xq+1−q) =
1+x
2 and thus independent of q, any constant strategy qA = qB = q ∈ [0, 1] is
optimal.
It is well known that experimental subjects often fail to play equilibrium
strategies. One model of bounded rationality that has proved to be successful
in explaining these experimental results is the Agent Quantal Response Equi-
librium (AQRE) of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). Its central idea is that indi-
viduals make mistakes when they try to maximize their payoffs but have correct
beliefs about the opponents actions. In the logit-AQRE, which is parameter-
ized by λ ∈ [0,∞), the sender transmits message m in state θ with probability
3The importance of the size of the message space is reported by Blume et. al (1998). The
authors show that in a sender-receiver game with multiple equilibria it depends on the size of
message space whether subjects converge to play a separating or a pooling equilibrium.
4We thank an anonymous referee for making this important suggestion.
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p˜(m|θ) = eλu(m|θ)P
i∈M eλu(i|θ)
, where u(i|θ) =∑a∈A q˜(a|i)·u(a, θ) denotes the expected
payoff from sending message i in state θ. Similarly, the receiver chooses action
a after observing message m with probability q˜(a|m) = eλv(a|m)P
j∈A eλv(j|m)
. Here,
v(j|m) corresponds to the expected payoff of taking action j upon message
m; that is, v(j|m) = ∑θ∈Θ µ˜(θ|m) · v(j, θ), where µ˜(θ|m) = p˜(m|θ)P
i∈Θ p˜(i|θ) is the
receiver’s posterior belief about the state θ when he observes message m.
For most sequential games it is impossible to find a closed-form solution for
the set of logit-AQRE, but here this task turns out to be rather simple. The
intuition for this runs as follows: It is well known that random play is the only
logit-AQRE for all sequential games when λ = 0 and that any logit-AQRE is
also a sequential equilibrium of the underlying game when λ tends to infinity
(see Theorem 2 in McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)). Since random play is the
only sequential equilibrium of the Benchmark Game according to Proposition
1, random play has also to be the only logit-AQRE for all λ. Thus, the only
remaining question is which sequential equilibrium is selected by the unique
logit-AQRE. It turns out that it is the symmetric one.
Proposition 2 The unique logit-AQRE of the Benchmark Game is given by the
set of strategies (p˜∗A, p˜
∗
B, q˜
∗
A, q˜
∗
B) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
)
and the supporting belief system
(µ˜∗A, µ˜
∗
B) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Proof: See Appendix B. ¤
We can derive from Proposition 2 the equilibrium levels of truth-telling and
trust. Given pA and pB, the probability that the sender lies in the Benchmark
Game is equal to lb(pA, pB) = p(A)(1 − pA) + p(B)pB. With a slight abuse
of notation let p(m = i) be the probability that the sender transmits message
i ∈ {A,B}. Then, the probability that the receiver trusts the sender in the
Benchmark Game is equal to tb(pA, pB) = p(m = A)µA + p(m = B)(1 − µB).
Proposition 3 establishes that the sender lies with probability one-half in all
sequential equilibria of the Benchmark Game, a strategy foreseen correctly by
the receiver in terms of trust.
Proposition 3 Let (p∗A, p
∗
B) be a sequential equilibrium strategy for the sender
in the Benchmark Game. Then, lb(p∗A, p
∗
B) = tb(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) =
1
2 .
Proof: The proof is straightforward and thus omitted. ¤
Our first null hypothesis is given by Proposition 3. The corresponding alter-
native hypothesis is divided into two parts: First, the sender should lie less
than predicted if preferences for truth-telling matter. If this is true, the best
response function of the receiver in the logit-AQRE model dictates to increase
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the probability with which action D is taken after message A and with which
action U is taken after message B, or, to say it differently, the receiver should
take more often the action trust.5
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the Benchmark Game, the senders lie in less than fifty
percent of all observations and the receivers trust the senders in more than fifty
percent of all observations.
Note that if Hypothesis 1 turns out to be correct and the senders tell the
truth more often than predicted by the unique logit-AQRE, we are still left to
guess the factor causing the excessive truth-telling, because it could in principle
be caused by some kind of bounded rationality that is not captured by the logit-
AQRE and not by preferences for truth-telling. For this reason, we introduce
punishments into the original game in order to trigger subject’s concerns for
procedural justice. We then study how individuals react to deceptions and use
these responses to indicate that preferences for truth-telling play a central role
in strategic information transmission.6
The Punishment Game
The Punishment Game extends the Benchmark Game. Let H be the set of all
histories of the Benchmark Game. Given a particular history h = h(a,m, θ) ∈
H, the receiver reduces the payoffs of both participants to zero with probability
r(h) ∈ [0, 1] and he accepts the payoff distribution induced by the Benchmark
Game with probability 1− r(h). Then, both players receive their payoff.
Given the strategy (pA, pB) of the sender in the Punishment Game, lp(pA, pB)
and tp(pA, pB) denote the probabilities that the sender lies and that the receiver
trusts the sender’s message, respectively. It is easy to calculate the set of se-
quential equilibria of the Punishment Game, because from a purely materialistic
point of view it is never optimal for the receiver to reduce payoffs. This is dif-
ferent for the logit-AQRE since it allows for noisy behavior: Given λ ∈ [0,∞)
5We equate the receivers trust(distrust) with receivers believing the payoff table to be the
one (opposite) of the sender’s message and playing a best response to this belief. As indicated
by an anonymous referee, one way to find out whether this method is correct is to ask the
receivers which payoff table they think they are facing following the sender’s message and
prior to their choice. We implemented this question in our robustness analysis. The resulting
overall error rate was as low as 7.8%.
6This approach is similar to the one Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) who address the importance
of reciprocity in public good games. Without punishments, reciprocal individuals have no
possibility to enforce a positive contribution level of the selfish people, and therefore, the
best they can do is not to contribute either. But if costly punishments are available, then
reciprocal types have a device to enforce high contribution levels of all subjects. One can also
draw obvious connections to the Dictatorship and the Ultimatum Game.
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and a history h ∈ H that insures the receiver a payoff of y ∈ {1, x}, the receiver
reduces payoffs to zero with probability r˜(h) = 1
1+eλy
. It follows then from a
backward induction argument that the probabilities p˜∗A, p˜
∗
B, q˜
∗
A and q˜
∗
B for the
Punishment Game must be the same as before. Hence, the equilibrium pre-
diction of the logit-AQRE is such that the sender (receiver) lies (trusts) again
with probability one-half.
Proposition 4 Given λ ∈ [0,∞), the logit-AQRE of the Punishment Game
is such that (a) for all h ∈ H that give the receiver a payoff of y ∈ {1, x},
r˜(h)∗ = 1
1+eλy
and (b) lp(p˜∗A, p˜
∗
B) = tp(p˜
∗
A, p˜
∗
B) =
1
2 .
Proof: See Appendix C. ¤
To derive our hypothesis with respect to the punishment behavior note that the
setH can be summarized by the histories h1 = (truth,trust), h2 = (truth,distrust),
h3 = (lie,trust), and h4 = (lie,distrust).7 According to Proposition 4, if re-
ceivers play the logit-AQRE, then the punishment rate after any history de-
pends only on the payoff the receiver foregoes. On the other hand, the inequity
aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
take into account that some individuals care not only about their own payoff
but about the whole payoff distribution. Since the payoff distribution after
the histories h2 = (truth,distrust) and h3 = (lie,trust) is equal to (x, 1), both
inequity aversion and the logit-AQRE predict that the punishment rate after
these two histories is the same. This constitutes our second null hypothesis.
Our alternative hypothesis is based on the findings of Brandts and Charness
(2003) who have shown that receivers punish senders more often if the payoff
distribution results from a deceptive message, suggesting thus that the utility
attached to a particular payoff distribution also depends on how it has been
reached. According to this experimental finding, individuals should punish
the sender more frequently after history h3 = (lie,trust) than after history
h2 = (truth,distrust). We do not expect any punishments after the histories
h1 = (truth,trust) and h4 = (lie,distrust), because the receiver interpreted the
message correctly and the resulting payoff distribution (1, x) is favorable to
him. If we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative one, then a
sender who lies is in more danger of being punished than a truth-teller. Thus,
we hypothesize that truth-telling is enhanced in the Punishment Game with
respect to the Benchmark Game and that the receivers consequently trust more
in the former than in the latter.
7In our experimental sessions we do not ask subjects to elicit their mixed strategies, rather
we derive them from the repeated observation of pure strategies. Then, since the payoff tables
A and B are symmetric and the probabilities p(A) and p(B) are identical, we can write the
set H as described. See also footnote #5.
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HYPOTHESIS 2: In the Punishment Game, the receivers punish the senders
only after the histories h2 = (truth, distrust) and h3 = (lie, trust) with the
punishment rate being higher after h3. Moreover, the senders lie less and the
receivers trust more in the Punishment than in the Benchmark Game.
According to our main hypothesis the excessive truth-telling is caused by
number of individuals that take into account social norms. To check this we
perform a final consistency test on the Punishment Game. After observing the
experimental results, we divide our subject pool into two different groups, one
group of subjects punishing liars frequently after history h3 = (lie,trust) and
another group containing the rest of the subjects. Given this division, the third
null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the level of truth-telling
between the two groups when subjects play the Punishment Game as senders.8
The corresponding alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the
group of subjects with a high sense of procedural justice account for most of
the excessive truth-telling in the Punishment Game; that is, these subjects tell
the truth very often whereas the rest of the subjects lie in about fifty percent
of the occasions.
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the Punishment Game, the group of subjects punishing
liars frequently after history h3 = (lie,trust) accounts for most of the excessive
truth-telling.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted our first experimental series (x=2) at the University of Edin-
burgh in May 2004. Since all economics students at this university have an
E-mail account associated to their matriculation number, we promoted the
experiment mainly via electronic newsletters. Students from other academic
disciplines were recruited through flyers distributed on the campus and further
announcements made on information boards. As a result, 132 undergraduate
students from nearly all faculties participated in one of our experimental ses-
sions. We organized a total of ten sessions, five on the Benchmark and five on
the Punishment Game. Twelve subjects participated in the first four sessions
and eighteen subjects in the fifth and last session of each treatment. No subject
took part in more than one session.
To perform the experiment we employed the computer software Z-Tree de-
veloped by Fischbacher (1999). At the beginning of a session, subjects met in a
8We use a role rotation mechanism in our experimental sessions so that every subject plays
the Punishment Game half of the time in each role. For more on this see Section 3.
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computer room and took place in front of one of the computers. The computers
were placed in such a way that all subjects could only look at their own screen.
Next to each computer we placed a closed envelope containing instructions, a
questionnaire, and a payment receipt. After subjects had filled out the ques-
tionnaire we read the instructions aloud (see Appendix D for the instructions
corresponding to the Punishment Game).
Before the first round of a session, the computer randomly divided subjects
into groups of six without revealing the actual matching. Thus, the students,
who were all anonymous to each other, did not know who else was in their
group. We informed every subject that s/he would only play against subjects
belonging to the same group. Therefore, the fact that the number of subjects
differed across sessions should not matter. So we implicitly divided our subject
pool into a total of twenty-two groups of six subjects, eleven groups playing each
treatment. In each of the fifty rounds of an experimental session the computer
matched the subjects belonging to the same group into three new pairs and
assigned different roles (sender or receiver) within pairs. The matchings were
balanced so that after fifty rounds every subject played the game exactly ten
times against each of her/his five opponents. Moreover, every subject met every
opponent five times in each role. The order of the matching within a group was
unknown to the subjects.
In every round, after pairs had been formed and roles had been assigned,
the sender was informed of whether table A or B had been selected. Then, the
sender transmitted a message from the message space M = {A,B} telling the
receiver which table corresponds to the actual payoff scheme. Afterwards, the
receiver chose an action from the action set A = {U,D}. This constituted the
end of the round in the Benchmark Game. In the sessions corresponding to the
Punishment Game, the receiver was further informed about the induced payoffs
of her/his action. Finally, s/he had to decide between accepting these payoffs
or reducing the payoff of both participants to zero.
At the end of a session, we called subjects one by one to step forward to the
control desk for payment. In addition to the five pounds show up fee, subjects
received ten pence per point in the payoff table; that is, subjects earned either
10 or 20 pence per round. As a result, the average payment in the one hour
session corresponding to the Benchmark and the Punishment Game was equal
to 12.5 pounds and 11.74 pounds, respectively.
The robustness analysis (x=9) was performed at Maastricht University in
December 2005. Students from the economics and business faculty were able to
register online for this experimental series. In total, 120 students participated
in one of the ten sessions (five with respect to both treatments). Since twelve
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students took part in every session, we obtained ten independent observation for
both treatments. The experimental design was nearly identical to the original
one, the only difference was that we asked the receivers additionally about
their beliefs with respect to the actual payoff table after observing the sender’s
message and before taking an action. This helped us to elicit the receiver’s
action space (see footnote #5). Due to financial constraints we paid less money
as in our first experimental series. Actually, students received for the one hour
experiment twice their average points per round. As a result, the average
payment was 10 Euros for students participating in the Benchmark Game and
about 9.27 Euros for the ones taking part in a session corresponding to the
Punishment Game.
4 Experimental Results (x=2)
4.1 Excessive Truth-Telling in the Benchmark Game
According to our first null hypothesis, the senders lie in the Benchmark Game
with probability one-half. In the histogram in the left part of Figure 2, we
represent the frequencies of truthful messages in the sessions corresponding to
the Benchmark Game. Since a subject was exactly 25 times in the role of the
sender, in equilibrium s/he should tell the truth 12.5 times. The data seems
to be slightly shifted to the right of the theoretical mean, but it is not clear-
cut enough to reject the null hypothesis straight away. In the right panel of
Figure 2, it is possible to observe that the percentage of subjects telling the
truth is extraordinarily high in the first rounds and declines over time in such
a way that it stays on average just above the 50%-line predicted by the null
hypothesis. We eliminate this learning effect by excluding the data from the
first ten rounds in our statistical analysis.
Put Figure 2 about here [caption: Senders’ Behavior (x = 2, Benchmark)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(2SB).eps (left panel) and
time(2SB).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
Since subjects belonging to the same group play the Benchmark Game more
than once against the other group members, actions within a given group are
likely to be correlated over time. One way of obtaining independent observations
is to calculate for every group the percentage of truthful messages over the last
forty rounds. This procedure allows us to derive a total of eleven independent
observations, one for each group. The overall percentage of truth-telling in the
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last forty rounds is equal to 55.07%, a percentage significantly greater than
50% (p-value of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.0615; p-value of the
one-tailed t-test = 0.0459).
Next, we provide evidence in favor of the second part of Hypothesis 1,
namely that the receivers adjust their beliefs in the correct direction and trust
the senders in more than fifty percent of all occasions. To this end, we interpret
the action of the receiver as the result of a maximization process involving
subjective beliefs about the truthfulness of the message. For example, if a
subject observes message A and takes action D afterwards, then this action
reveals in our understanding that the subject trusted the sender’s message. In
the histogram in the left panel of Figure 3, we can clearly see that a lot of
receivers trust more often than the theoretical prediction of 12.5 times. If we
analyze the evolution of this percentage over time (the right panel of Figure 3),
one observes that it is particularly low in the first rounds before it stabilizes
well above the 50%-line.
Put Figure 3 about here [caption: Receivers’ Behavior (x = 2, Benchmark)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(2RB).eps (left panel) and
time(2RB).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and
placed next to each other.
In the last forty rounds of the experiment the receivers trusted the senders’
messages in 58.7% of all observations. This value is significantly greater than
the theoretical prediction (p-value of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test
= 0.0019; p-value of the one-tailed t-test = 0.0006). Hence, we reject the null
hypothesis in favor of Hypothesis 1.
In addition to their statistical significance, these deviations from the equilib-
rium prediction are economically relevant. Given receivers’ behavior, senders’
expected payoff when they send a truthful message is a 11% lower compared
to the case when they lie. Subjects are thus foregoing a significant amount by
telling the truth. On the other hand, excessive truth-telling also means that
receivers who trust the sender’s message get in expectation a 6.5% higher payoff
than if they distrust.
4.2 Procedural Justice in the Punishment Game
So far we have shown the existence of excessive truth-telling in the Benchmark
Game. The analysis of the Punishment Game will help us to shed light on the
origin of this result. In Table 2 below we present the punishment behavior of
the receivers. For consistency reasons we only consider punishments in the last
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forty rounds, and therefore, we have a total of 1320 observations (11 groups of
40 rounds and 3 observations per round). The senders told the truth 740 times
and lied in 580 occasions. The receivers trusted the message 520 times when
the sender had told the truth before and 396 times when the sender had lied.
Put Table 2 about here [caption: Punishment Behavior (x = 2)].
The punishment rate is the highest, more than 25%, after history h3 =
(lie,trust). We use the normal approximation of the binomial distribution in
order to establish that this proportion is significantly greater than zero (p-
value of the one-tailed Z-test < 0.0001). We also find, as expected, that the
punishment rate after history h2 = (truth,distrust) is significantly greater than
zero. We attribute the positive punishment rate after history h4 = (lie,distrust)
to mistakes made by some subjects. Yet, our main prediction is confirmed: The
willingness to punish the sender depends on whether or not a payoff distribution
has been reached by means of a deceptive message, because the punishment
rate after history h3 = (lie,trust) is greater than the one after history h2 =
(truth,distrust). A test of equal proportions confirms this observation (p-value
of the one-tailed Z-test < 0.0001).
We investigate next whether subjects behave consistently across the two
treatments. The histogram in left panel of Figure 4 looks quite similar to the
one corresponding to sender’s behavior in the Benchmark Game although it
seems that the shift to the right from the theoretical mean has increased. In
the right panel of Figure 4, we observe that the percentage of subjects telling
the truth is quite high in the first rounds and declines over time, a behavior we
have already encountered before. Nevertheless, in the latter rounds there are
now less values below the fifty percent line.
Put Figure 4 about here [caption: Senders’ Behavior (x = 2, Punishment)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(2SP).eps (left panel) and
time(2SP).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
The percentage of subjects telling the truth in the last forty rounds of the
Punishment Game is equal to 56.29%. This percentage is significantly greater
than the equilibrium prediction (p-value of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum
test = 0.0499; p-value of the one-tailed t-test = 0.0343), but it is not signifi-
cantly greater than the corresponding value for the Benchmark Game (p-value
of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.409; p-value of the one-tailed
t-test = 0.3855).
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The picture looks quite different if we compare the receivers’ behavior across
the two treatments. The histogram in the left panel of Figure 5 indicates that
the receivers trust more in the Punishment than in the Benchmark Game. This
intuition is confirmed in the right panel of Figure 5, because the percentage of
receivers trusting the sender seems to increase over time and stays well above the
equilibrium prediction. On the aggregate, the percentage of trustful receivers in
the last forty rounds is equal to 69.3%. This percentage is significantly greater
than the corresponding value of the Benchmark Game (p-value of the one-tailed
Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.0031; p-value of the one-tailed t-test = 0.0036).
Put Figure 5 about here [caption: Receivers’ Behavior (x = 2, Punishment)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(2RP).eps (left panel) and
time(2RP).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
Again, the economic significance of the observed departures from the equilib-
rium predictions is considerable. Not only are punishments relatively frequent,
but also lying becomes the optimal strategy given receivers’ trust-worthiness
and punishments rates: By telling the truth, senders receive in expectation a
4.8% lower payoff than if they lie; whereas receivers gain in expected terms, and
without taking into account the punishments, a 8.7% by trusting the sender’s
message.
To summarize: We have confirmed the importance of procedural justice in
this sender-receiver game. People frequently punish when they are deceived.
Moreover, the introduction of punishments into the Benchmark Game seems to
induce the receivers to believe that the senders will often tell the truth in order
to avoid a possible moral outrage caused by deceptive messages. But on the
contrary, when subjects play as senders they seem to consider the punishment
as an incredible threat, because they barely change their behavior with respect
to the original set-up.
4.3 Morally Consistent Behavior
So far we have laid down the ground for our main result, namely that the tension
between incentives and normative social behavior is the driving force behind the
excessive truth-telling. After observing the experimental results, we divide our
subject pool into two groups, one group containing all those subjects who punish
liars frequently after history h3 = (lie,trust) and another group containing the
rest of subjects. We obtain this division in the following way: In the last forty
rounds of an experimental session corresponding to the Punishment Game every
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subject is twenty times in the role of the receiver. Since the sender lies with
probability 0.437 and the receiver trusts the message with probability 0.694,
every subject plays, in expected terms, the history h3 = (lie,trust) 6.06 times
in the role of the receiver. The punishment rate after h3 is equal to 0.2525, and
therefore, every subject is expected to punish the sender 1.53 times. Hence,
all subjects that punish the sender in at least three occasions after h3 reveal
serious concerns for procedural justice. This condition is met by fifteen out of
sixty-six subjects. Not surprisingly, this group of subjects accounts for 90% of
all punishments after h3. Moreover, from the 110 times one subject belonging to
this group played history h3 in the role of the receiver, the sender was punished
in 90 occasions (this is equal to a punishment rate of 81.81%) whereas the rest
of the individuals punished the sender only 3.16% of all observations after this
history.
Given this classification, the role rotation mechanism allows us to study
how these fifteen subjects behave in the Punishment Game. On the aggregate,
they tell the truth in 70.66% of all observations. This probability is signifi-
cantly greater than 56.29%, the percentage of truth-telling corresponding to
the whole subject pool (p-value of the one-tailed Z-test < 0.0001). The rest of
the subjects, on the other hand, tell the truth in only 52.05% of the cases, a
percentage not significantly greater than the equilibrium prediction (p-value of
the one-tailed Z-test = 0.0945). Therefore, we reject the third null hypothesis -
the percentage is the same for both groups of subjects - in favor of Hypothesis
3.9 This result indicates the existence of what we refer to as morally consistent
behavior: Individuals with a strong notion of procedural justice behave consis-
tently across roles and are responsible for nearly all the information transmitted
by the senders. This interpretation is further strengthened if we analyze how
the beliefs of these two groups vary. Subjects with a serious notion for procedu-
ral justice trust the senders’ message in 86% of all occasions, whereas the rest
of subjects do so only in 64.51%.
5 Robustness Analysis (x=9)
How do our results change as we increase the inequality in the payoff distribution
between sender and receiver while maintaining incentives the same? To address
this question, we run an additional experimental series considering the case
when x = 9. According to our fourth null hypothesis this change should not
9A different consistency test puts into one group all individuals that never punish a sender.
It turns out that this group tells the truth with probability 0.484, a value that is not signifi-
cantly different from logit-AQRE. The group consisting of all subject that punish a sender at
least once, on the other hand, tells the truth with probability 0.684.
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affect the experimental results. Next, we are going to develop our alternative
hypothesis, which points in a different direction.
Suppose that participants play the Benchmark Game. If x = 2 and the
sender thinks that the receiver will take the action trust (this action could
be defined as the social standard), then her optimal strategy would be to lie
and the associated cost of telling the truth is 1. This cost is rather small in
comparison to the case when x = 9 and suggests that senders lie more when the
price of truth-telling increases (see e.g. Zwick and Chen (1999)). According
to the best response function of the logit-AQRE, the receivers should then also
trust less. What we expect to see is that an increase in inequality leads to a
clear shift towards the logit-AQRE.
Perhaps surprisingly, we conjecture the opposite result in the Punishment
Game. Since the payoff distributions are now less “fair”, models of inequity
aversion predict that the receivers punish more whenever they get the low payoff
(this corresponds to the history h2 and h3). At the same time, the receivers may
feel even more deceived after history h3 according to the notion of procedural
justice, because they see that the sender gets away with an even larger share of
the total payoff thanks to her unethical behavior. This should lead to additional
punishments, and therefore, the difference in the punishment rates between h2
and h3 should increase in comparison to our first experimental series. As a
consequence, the level of truth-telling and trust should also increase.
HYPOTHESIS 4: In the Benchmark Game, senders lie less and receivers trust
more when x = 2. In the Punishment Game, the difference in the punishment
rate between h3 = (lie,trust) and h2 = (truth,distrust) is higher when x = 9. As
a consequence, senders tell the truth more often and receivers trust more when
x = 9.
5.1 Equilibrium Play in the Benchmark Game
Hypothesis 4 states that there should be a drift towards the logit-AQRE in the
Benchmark Game. Figure 6 provides a first indication that this is true for the
sender. The data in the histogram in the left panel of Figure 6 seems to be
centered around the equilibrium prediction. Additionally, we see in the right
panel of Figure 6 that the level of truth-telling converges quickly towards the
equilibrium prediction and oscillates around it afterwards. These observations
are confirmed by the statistics: the percentage of truth-telling over the last
forty rounds is equal to 50.6%. This value is significantly smaller than the
corresponding percentage for the first experimental series of 55.07% (p-value of
the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.1105; p-value of the one-tailed t-test
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= 0.111) and not significantly greater than the equilibrium prediction (p-value
of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.4549; p-value of the one-tailed
t-test = 0.3803).
Put Figure 6 about here [caption: Senders’ Behavior (x = 9, Benchmark)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(9SB).eps (left panel) and
time(9SB).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
Next, we analyze whether receivers also behaved according to the equilib-
rium prediction; is the percentage of trust lower than before? The histogram in
left panel of Figure 7 and the evolution of the percentage of trust in the right
panel of the same Figure do not seem to support this conjecture. Both look very
much the same as before. The percentage of trust over the last forty rounds is
now equal to 58.8%. This value is significantly greater than the equilibrium pre-
diction (p-value of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.0029; p-value of
the one-tailed t-test = 0.001). Recall that in the first series it was 58.7%. These
two values are obviously not significantly different from each other (p-value of
the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.5808; p-value of the one-tailed t-test
= 0.5009).
Put Figure 7 about here [caption: Receivers’ Behavior (x = 9, Benchmark)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(9RB).eps (left panel) and
time(9RB).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and
placed next to each other.
Our analysis reveals that the excessive truth-telling vanishes as more in-
equality is introduced into the payoff distribution. This is consistent with the
results found in Gneezy (2005) because senders are now able to achieve a higher
gain from deceiving the receiver, or alternatively, according to Zwick and Chen
(1999), because the relative price of truth-telling has increased and its demand
has consequently dropped. We have predicted this result in Hypothesis 4. How-
ever, it is surprising that, although they should move together, excessive trust-
worthiness does not vanish. We have no clear explanation for this. On the one
hand, senders are basically randomizing and this leaves receivers indifferent be-
tween trusting or not the sender’s message (the receiver’s expected payoff from
trusting the message is only a 0.8% higher than from not trusting). Hence,
receivers might be just conforming to a social standard or taking the simplest
strategy they can think of. On the other hand, it may well be the case that
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receivers held wrong beliefs about senders’ behavior and expected higher levels
of truth-telling.10
5.2 Enhanced Procedural Justice in the Punishment Game
Even though the excessive truth-telling has apparently vanished, it is still worth-
while to analyze the corresponding Punishment Game. First, because it consti-
tutes an obvious robustness check of our former results. But more importantly
because it can put at test our claim that procedural justice becomes more focal
as the inequality of the payoff distribution increases. In Table 3 we present
the punishment behavior of the receivers. We have a total of 1200 observations
(10 groups of 40 rounds and 3 observations per round). The senders told the
truth 675 times and lied in 525 occasions. The receivers trusted the message
490 times when the sender had told the truth and 194 times when the sender
had lied.
Put Table 3 about here [caption: Punishment Behavior (x = 9)].
Our main observation is that the punishment rate increased from 25.2% to
42.8% after history h3 = (lie,trust) and from 5.4% to 13.4% after history h2 =
(truth,distrust). According to the logit-AQRE none of the two values should
have changed. Inequity aversion, on the other hand, explains why the receivers
punish the sender more often after these histories, but it cannot account for
the fact that difference in the punishment rates between history h3 and h2
has increased from 19.8% to over 29.4%. Since the latter value is significantly
greater than the corresponding value in our first experimental series (p-value of
the one-tailed Z-test < 0.0001), we reject the null hypothesis that the value of x
does not influence the difference in the punishment rate in favor of Hypothesis 4
that procedural justice has become even more important. Furthermore, observe
that there are no punishments any more after history h4 = (lie,distrust).
Now, we want to study whether this result has any effect on the aggregate
level of truth-telling and the aggregate level of trust in the Punishment Game.
In the histogram in the left panel of Figure 8 we observe that the senders behave
very heterogeneously, whereas the right panel reveals that the percentage of
truth-telling per round stays rather constantly above the equilibrium prediction.
The percentage of truth-telling over the last forty rounds is equal to 56.4%
whereas the corresponding value in our first experimental series was 56.3%. The
former value is not significantly greater than the latter (p-value of the one-tailed
10Because levels of truth-worthiness remain the same compared to the case of x = 2, the
expected loss from telling the truth instead of sending a deceptive message is again 11%.
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Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.5391; p-value of the one-tailed t-test = 0.4876),
but obviously it is significantly greater than the equilibrium prediction (p-value
of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.0186; p-value of the one-tailed
t-test = 0.0167). Thus, we accept the null hypothesis that the value of x does
not effect the senders’ behavior in the Punishment Game.
Put Figure 8 about here [caption: Senders’ Behavior (x = 9, Punishment)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(9SP).eps (left panel) and
time(9SP).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
However, the reader should note that the introduction of punishments in the
second experimental series does enhance truth-telling compared to the Bench-
mark Game. The percentage of truthful messages remains above the equilibrium
prediction despite the fact that increased inequality made the excessive truth-
telling vanish in the Benchmark Game. Two countervailing forces seem to be at
work here: On the one hand, the higher punishment rates when x=9 certainly
induce senders to tell the truth more often but at the same time the gain from
lying (or alternatively, the price of truth-telling) has increased. Even though
the net effect is positive in comparison with the Benchmark Game when x=9,
the overall effect nullifies in comparison with the level of truth-telling in the
Punishment Game when x=2.
Now, we analyze whether the behavior of the receiver remains robust to
an increase in inequality. Figure 9 bears a lot of similarities with Figure 5,
where we presented our results with respect to the receivers’ behavior in the
original Punishment Game. Now, the percentage of trust over the last forty
rounds is equal to 71.1%. This value is significantly greater than the equilibrium
prediction of 50% (p-value of the one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.001; p-
value of the one-tailed t-test < 0.0001), but not significantly greater than 69.3%,
the percentage corresponding to the original set-up (p-value of the one-tailed
Wilcoxon rank-sum test = 0.2461; p-value of the one-tailed t-test = 0.344).
Thus, we accept the null hypothesis that the value of x does not influence the
receiver’s behavior in the Punishment Game.
Put Figure 9 about here [caption: Receivers’ Behavior (x = 9, Punishment)].
The corresponding graphic files are called hist(9RP).eps (left panel) and
time(9RP).eps (right panel). They should be scaled down to 47.5% and placed
next to each other.
An interesting point to make is that the wider gap between the punishment
rates for histories h3 = (lie,trust) and h2 = (truth,distrust) now makes telling
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the truth the optimal strategy for senders. A truthful message increases their
expected payoff by a 9.1 % compared to lying; meanwhile, trusting the sender
(no punishments considered) enhances receivers’ expected payoff by a 8.9%.
5.3 Morally Consistent Behavior
Our last aim is to study whether the excessive truth-telling in the Punishment
Game can again be explained in terms of preferences for truth-telling. Since
the sender lies with probability 0.436 and the receiver trusts the message with
probability 0.711, every subject plays, in expected terms, the history h3 =
(lie,trust) 6.2 times in the role of the receiver. The punishment rate after h3 is
equal to 0.4286, and therefore, every subject is expected to punish the sender
2.65 times. Hence, all subjects that punish the sender in at least five occasions
after h3 reveal serious concerns for procedural justice. This condition is met by
seventeen out of sixty subjects. This group of subjects accounts for 78.8% of
all punishments after h3 and punishes the sender with probability 0.8282 after
this history. The rest of the individuals punish the sender only in 15.34% of all
observations after this history. This value, by the way, is more or less the same
percentage as the overall punishment rate after history h2.
On the aggregate, the group of individuals with serious concerns for pro-
cedural justice tell the truth in 69.4% of all observations. This probability is
significantly greater than 56.4%, the percentage of truth-telling corresponding
to the whole subject pool (p-value of the one-tailed Z-test < 0.0001). Since the
rest of the subjects tell the truth in only 51.20% of the cases, we can conclude
that our main hypothesis is robust to the change in the potential payoff dis-
tribution. Further indications for this interpretation stem from the fact that
the group of “moral” individuals trusts the sender in 84.7% of all cases whereas
the rest of the subjects do so only with probability 0.656. Finally, the group
of individuals who never punish tells the truth with probability 0.485, whereas
the group of subjects that punish in the last forty rounds at least once tells the
truth with probability 0.6287.
6 Conclusion
Communication is the most natural way how to exchange information. Ex-
perimental studies such as the ones of Duffy and Feltovich (2002) and (2006)
have shown that individuals are able to achieve Pareto improving allocations
by means of cheap talk. In particular, the authors show that if subjects an-
nounce to cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, then this message often reflects
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the truth. Moreover, receivers reciprocate and cooperate as well so the Pareto-
efficient outcome is sometimes implemented. On the other hand, Crawford
(2003) shows that in some sequential equilibria of a sender-receiver game a ra-
tional individual can feint a boundedly rational one. These results raise some
questions. In which situations can the receiver trust the senders’ messages?
And why do the senders transmit truthful messages if incentives suggest oth-
erwise? Our aim was to show that the overcommunication phenomenon of Cai
and Wang (2005) is not necessarily due to a lack of sophistication or rationality
but results from the fact that some individuals take into account social norms
such as truth-telling.
To this end, we studied the behavior of a group of subjects in a simple
game of strategic information transmission. We showed in the first step of our
analysis that in the Benchmark Game, senders tell the truth more often than
predicted by the unique logit-AQRE. Then, we introduced punishments and
established that, in accordance with the results of Brandts and Charness (2003),
the willingness to punish the sender is higher after a deceptive message. Finally,
we sustained our main hypothesis by showing that if we subtract from our
subject pool the group of subjects who punish liars frequently after a deceptive
message, then that very same group tells the truth very often whereas the rest of
the subjects behave roughly according to the standard equilibrium prediction.
Thus, if moral subjects are excluded, the excessive truth-telling vanishes. In our
robustness analysis we increased the inequality of the payoff distribution leaving
incentives the same. Our two main findings are that there is no excessive truth-
telling any more in the Benchmark Game and that the notion of procedural
justice becomes even more important in the Punishment Game.
In further research we intend to explore the existence and extent of the
morally consistent behavior that we have uncovered in the present paper. The
existence of moral individuals who reject material incentives to misbehave opens
some fascinating questions: What are the implications on mechanism design?
Or on the organization of the firm? And on the elaboration of policy prescrip-
tions?
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that pA (or pB, respectively) denotes the probability that the sender
submits message A when the actual payoff scheme is represented by table A (or
table B, respectively). We divide our analysis into three different cases.
Case 1: Suppose that 0 < pA+pB < 2. We derive the best response correspon-
dence for the receiver who takes the strategy (pA, pB) of the sender as given.
Suppose that the sender transmits message A. By sequential rationality the
receiver updates his beliefs according to Bayes’ rule, and therefore, he thinks
that the probability µ(A|A) ≡ µA (e.g. the true payoff scheme is given by table
A conditional on message A) is equal to
µA =
p(m=A|θ=A)p(A)
p(m=A) =
0.5pA
0.5pA+0.5pB
= pApA+pB .
Given µA, the receiver chooses qA (the probability to take action U conditional
on message A) in order to
max
qA
(µA (qA + x (1− qA)) + (1− µA) (xqA + 1− qA)) .
This maximization problem is equivalent to
max
qA
(1 + (x− 1)µA + (x− 1)qA (1− 2µA)) ,
and therefore, the best response correspondence for the receiver is
q∗A (µA) =

1 if µA < 12
[0, 1] if µA = 12
0 if µA > 12 ,
or q∗A (pA, pB) =

1 if pA < pB
[0, 1] if pA = pB
0 if pA > pB .
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If, on the other hand, the sender submits message B, then the belief that the
actual payoff scheme is represented by table A, µB, is equal to
µB =
p(m=B|θ=A)p(B)
p(m=B) =
0.5(1−pA)
0.5(1−pA)+0.5(1−pB) =
1−pA
2−pA−pB .
Given µB, the receiver chooses qB (the probability to take action U conditional
on message B) in order to
max
qB
(µB (qB + x (1− qB)) + (1− µB) (xqB + 1− qB)) .
This maximization problem is equivalent to
max
qB
(1 + (x− 1)µB + (x− 1)qB(1− 2µB)) ,
and therefore, the best response correspondence of the receiver is
q∗B (µB) =

1 if µB < 12
[0, 1] if µB = 12
0 if µB > 12 ,
or q∗B (pA, pB) =

1 if pA > pB
[0, 1] if pA = pB
0 if pA < pB .
Next, we calculate the optimal mixed strategy (p∗A, p
∗
B) for the sender. To
do so we consider three different cases:
Case A: Suppose that p∗A < p
∗
B. Then, it follows from the optimal behavior
of the receiver that q∗A(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) = 1 and q
∗
B(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) = 0. Thus, the optimal
strategy (p∗A, p
∗
B) must be the solution of the following maximization problem:
Choose pA and pB in order to
max
pA,pB
0.5 (xpA + pB + 1− pA + x (1− pB)) .
This maximization problem is equivalent to
max
pA,pB
0.5(x− 1) (1 + pA − pB) .
But the solution to this problem is such that p∗A = 1 and p
∗
B = 0, and therefore,
we have reached a contradiction. We conclude that there does not exist any
equilibrium in which p∗A < p
∗
B.
Case B: Suppose that p∗A > p
∗
B. Then, it follows from the optimal behavior of
the receiver that q∗A(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) = 0 and q
∗
B(p
∗
A, p
∗
B) = 1, and therefore, the optimal
strategy (p∗A, p
∗
B) must be the solution of the following maximization problem:
Choose pA and pB in order to
max
pA,pB
0.5 (pA + x (1− pA) + xpB + 1− pB) .
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This maximization problem is equivalent to
max
pA,pB
0.5(x− 1) (1− pA + pB) .
But the solution to this problem is such that p∗A = 0 and p
∗
B = 1, and therefore,
we have reached a contradiction. We conclude that there does not exist any
equilibrium in which p∗A > p
∗
B.
Case C: Suppose that p∗A = p
∗
B. Then, it follows from the best response cor-
respondences of the receiver that q∗A ∈ [0, 1] and q∗B ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the sender
faces the problem
max
pA,pB
0.5pA (xqA + 1− qA) + 0.5 (1− pA) (xqB + 1− qB)+
0.5pB (qA + x (1− qA)) + 0.5 (1− pB) (qB + x (1− qB)) ,
a problem that is equivalent to
max
pA,pB
0.5(x− 1) (1 + pA (qA − qB) + pB (qB − qA)) .
Hence, the best response correspondences for the sender are
p∗A (qA, qB) =

1 if qA > qB
[0, 1] if qA = qB
0 if qA < qB
and p∗B (qA, qB) =

1 if qA < qB
[0, 1] if qA = qB
0 if qA > qB .
From inspection we see that the set of mixed strategies (p∗A, p
∗
B; q
∗
A, q
∗
B) =
(p, p; q, q), where p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ [0, 1], can be sustained as equilibrium
strategies. Finally, one can easily check that the corresponding beliefs are such
that µ∗A = µ
∗
B =
1
2 .
Case 2: Suppose that p∗A = p
∗
B = 0. Observe from the best correspondence
of the sender in case 1.C that p∗A = p
∗
B = 0 can only be sustained as an
equilibrium strategy if q∗A = q
∗
B. Moreover, p
∗
A = p
∗
B = 0 implies that µ
∗
B =
1
2
and q∗B(µ
∗
B) ∈ [0, 1]. Since the sequential game we study consists of two-periods
and the cardinality of the action space of both players is equal to two, any belief
µA ∈ [0, 1] is consistent. Yet, we obtain from the best response correspondence
q∗A(µA) in case 1 that q
∗
A = q
∗
B if and only if µA =
1
2 . Therefore, we conclude
that the set of mixed strategies (p∗A, p
∗
B; q
∗
A, q
∗
B) = (0, 0; q, q), where q ∈ [0, 1],
together with the belief system µ∗A = µ
∗
B =
1
2 constitutes a set of sequential
equilibria.
Case 3: Suppose that p∗A = p
∗
B = 1. Observe from the best correspondence of
the sender in case 1.C that p∗A = p
∗
B = 1 can only be sustained as an equilibrium
strategy if q∗A = q
∗
B. Moreover, p
∗
A = p
∗
B = 1 implies that µ
∗
A =
1
2 and q
∗
A(µ
∗
A) ∈
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[0, 1]. Although any belief µB ∈ [0, 1] is consistent, we obtain from the best
response correspondence q∗B(µB) in case 1 that q
∗
A = q
∗
B if and only if µB =
1
2 . Therefore, we conclude that the set of mixed strategies (p
∗
A, p
∗
B; q
∗
A, q
∗
B) =
(1, 1; q, q), where q ∈ [0, 1], together with the belief system µ∗A = µ∗B = 12
constitutes a set of sequential equilibria. ¤
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Remember that p˜A (or, p˜B respectively) denotes the probability in the logit-
AQRE that the sender submits message A when the actual payoff scheme is
represented by table A (or, table B respectively). Similarly, q˜A (or, q˜B respec-
tively) indicates the probability that the receiver takes action U upon message
A (or, message B respectively). Given λ ∈ [0,∞), we yield that
p˜A = e
λu(A|A)
eλu(A|A)+eλu(B|A) and p˜B =
eλu(A|B)
eλu(A|B)+eλu(B|B) ,
where (a) u(A|A) = xq˜A + (1 − q˜A) = 1 + (x − 1)q˜A is the expected payoff of
sending message A if the payoff scheme is represented by table A, (b) u(B|A) =
xq˜B+(1− q˜B) = 1+(x−1)q˜B is the expected payoff of message B in state A, (c)
u(A|B) = q˜A+x(1−q˜A) = x−(x−1)q˜A represents the expected payoff of message
A when table B actually represents payoffs and (d) u(B|B) = q˜B+x(1− q˜B) =
x− (x− 1)q˜B denotes the expected payoff of sending message B in state B. It
is then easy to verify that
p˜A(q˜A, q˜B) = 11+eλ(x−1)(q˜B−q˜A) and p˜B(q˜A, q˜B) =
1
1+eλ(x−1)(q˜A−q˜B)
.
Notice that p˜A + p˜B = 1. So far, we have expressed the strategy of the
sender as a function of the receivers’s strategy. In the next step, we calculate
the best response functions for the receiver. We obtain that
q˜A = e
λv(U|A)
eλv(U|A)+eλv(D|A) and q˜B =
eλv(U|B)
eλv(U|B)+eλv(D|B) ,
where (a) v(U |A) = p˜A + xp˜B = 1 + (x− 1)p˜B is the expected payoff of taking
action U upon message A, (b) v(D|A) = xp˜A+p˜B = 1+(x−1)p˜A is the expected
payoff of action D when the sender says that the actual payoff table is A, (c)
v(U |B) = (1− p˜A)+x(1− p˜B) = x−(x−1)p˜B represents the expected payoff of
action A upon message B and (d) v(D|B) = x(1− p˜A)+(1− p˜B) = x−(x−1)p˜A
denotes the expected payoff of sending message B in state B. We can then verify
that
q˜A(p˜A, p˜B) = 11+eλ(x−1)(p˜A−p˜B) and q˜B(p˜A, p˜B) =
1
1+eλ(x−1)(p˜B−p˜A)
.
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Up to now we have identified a system of four linear equations with the un-
knowns p˜A, p˜B, q˜A, and q˜A. Since p˜B = 1− p˜A and q˜B = 1− q˜A, we can reduce
the four equations to two:
p˜A(q˜A) = 11+eλ(x−1)(1−2q˜A) and q˜A(p˜A) =
1
1+eλ(x−1)(2p˜A−1)
.
It is easy to see that p˜∗A = q˜
∗
A =
1
2 is the only solution of the two equations
above. It follows immediately that p˜∗B = q˜
∗
B =
1
2 and µ˜
∗
A = µ˜
∗
B =
1
2 . ¤
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
Fix the parameter λ ∈ [0,∞). Notice that if the history h ∈ H is such that
the receiver gets a payoff of 1, then the receiver will punish the sender with
probability r˜(h)∗ = 1
1+eλ
. Similarly, if he gets a payoff of x, then he will punish
the sender with probability r˜(h)∗ = 1
1+eλx
. Knowing this, we can now apply a
backward induction argument to solve for the optimal probabilities p˜∗A, p˜
∗
B, q˜
∗
A
and q˜∗B in the very same way as before. For the sender we find that
p˜A = e
λu(A|A)
eλu(A|A)+eλu(B|A) and p˜B =
eλu(A|B)
eλu(A|B)+eλu(B|B) ,
where (a) u(A|A) = xq˜A eλx1+eλx + e
λ
1+eλ
(1 − q˜A) = eλ1+eλ + q˜A
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
is
the expected payoff of sending message A if the payoff scheme is represented by
table A, (b) u(B|A) = xq˜B eλx1+eλx + e
λ
1+eλ
(1− q˜B) = eλ1+eλ + q˜B
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
is the expected payoff of message B in state A, (c) u(A|B) = q˜A eλ1+eλ + x(1 −
q˜A) e
λx
1+eλx
= x e
λx
1+eλx
− q˜A
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
represents the expected payoff of
message A when table B actually represents payoffs and (d) u(B|B) = q˜B eλ1+eλ+
x(1− q˜B) eλx1+eλx = x e
λx
1+eλx
− q˜B
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
denotes the expected payoff of
sending message B in state B. It is then easy to verify that
p˜A(q˜A, q˜B) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(q˜B−q˜A)
and
p˜B(q˜A, q˜B) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(q˜A−q˜B)
.
Notice that p˜A + p˜B = 1. So far, we have expressed the strategy of the sender
as a function of the receivers’s strategy. In the next step, we calculate the best
response functions for the receiver. We obtain that
q˜A = e
λv(U|A)
eλv(U|A)+eλv(D|A) and q˜B =
eλv(U|B)
eλv(U|B)+eλv(D|B) ,
where (a) v(U |A) = p˜A eλ1+eλ + xp˜B e
λx
1+eλx
= e
λ
1+eλ
+ p˜B
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
is the
expected payoff of taking action U upon message A, (b) v(D|A) = xp˜A eλx1+eλx +
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p˜B
eλ
1+eλ
= e
λ
1+eλ
+ p˜A
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
is the expected payoff of action D when
the sender says that the actual payoff table is A, (c) v(U |B) = (1− p˜A) eλ1+eλ +
x(1− p˜B) eλx1+eλx = x e
λx
1+eλx
− p˜B
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
represents the expected payoff
of action A upon message B and (d) v(D|B) = x(1− p˜A) eλx1+eλx + e
λ
1+eλ
(1− p˜B) =
x e
λx
1+eλx
− p˜A
(
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
)
denotes the expected payoff of sending message
B in state B. We can then verify that
q˜A(p˜A, p˜B) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(p˜A−p˜B)
and
q˜B(p˜A, p˜B) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(p˜B−p˜A)
.
Up to now we have identified a system of four linear equations with the un-
knowns p˜A, p˜B, q˜A, and q˜A. Since p˜B = 1− p˜A and q˜B = 1− q˜A, we can reduce
the four equations to two:
p˜A(q˜A) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(1−2q˜A)
and
q˜A(p˜A) = 1
1+e
λ
„
x e
λx
1+eλx
− eλ
1+eλ
«
(2p˜A−1)
.
It is easy to see that p˜∗A = q˜
∗
A =
1
2 is the only solution of the two equations
above. It follows immediately that p˜∗B = q˜
∗
B =
1
2 and µ˜
∗
A = µ˜
∗
B =
1
2 . Finally, we
can calculate that lp(p˜A, p˜B) = tp(p˜A, p˜B) = 12 . ¤
Appendix D: Instructions of the Punishment Game
Welcome
Thank you for coming. The purpose of this session is to study how people make
decisions in a particular situation. If you have any questions, feel free to raise
your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. From now
until the end of the session unauthorized communication of any nature with
any other participant is prohibited. The experiment will be conducted through
computers and all interactions between you will take place through them.
During the session you will play a game that gives you the opportunity to make
money. What you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on the
decisions of others. At the end of the session, the amount you earned will be
paid to you privately in cash.
We start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period you will
be given a description of the experiment. We are about to begin.
General Instructions
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In your envelope you will find a questionnaire and an official receipt. Fill
in the questionnaire and write down your name and matriculation number in
the receipt. You will need both forms to receive your payment at the end of
the session. Your personal data will be kept confidential and will be used for
statistical purposes only.
In this session, you will play a game which is repeated for 50 rounds. Before
the first round, the computer will randomly divide the participants into groups
of six. This division will last for the entire session. Participants within each
group will play only among themselves. The assignment process is random and
anonymous so you will not know who is in your group.
Next, we will go over a brief tutorial. Please interrupt at any time if you have
a question.
At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly joined with another
participant from your group to form a pair. In each pair, one participant is
randomly chosen to be the Sender, and one to be the Receiver. Remember
that this process is random and the assignment changes every round.
Each round, after pairs have been formed and roles have been assigned, the
computer selects one of the following two payoff tables. Final payoffs for both
participants will be determined according to the selected table and the action
U or D taken by the Receiver later on.
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U 2 Points 1 Point
Action D 1 Point 2 Points
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 Point 2 Points
Action D 2 Points 1 Point
Sender’s Instructions
At the beginning of the round only the Sender will be informed about the
actual payoff table chosen by the computer. The Sender is the first one to take
a decision in the game. S/He must communicate to the Receiver whether the
payoff table chosen by the computer is either table A or table B. Please, take
into account that the Sender is free to tell the truth or to lie. The
computer screen for the Sender is as follows:
Put Figure 10 about here (caption: none). The corresponding graphic file is
called figure3.eps and should be scaled down to 80%.
The two tables at the top of the screen represent payoffs according to tables A
and B. Below you find the information whether table A or table B was chosen
by the computer (in our example it is table B). On the inferior right corner
there are two buttons labelled A and B. By clicking on the buttons A or B
you inform the Receiver that you have observed the corresponding table. The
Sender has 20 seconds to take this decision. This is the only decision the
Sender takes.
Receiver’s Instructions
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The Receiver takes two decisions. First, once the Receiver got the Sender’s
message, s/he has to decide between actions U and D. The computer screen
for the Receiver is as follows:
Put Figure 11 about here (caption: none). The corresponding graphic file is
called figure4.eps and should be scaled down to 82.7%.
The two tables at the top of the screen represent payoffs according to tables
A and B. Below you find the message from the Sender regarding the table
s/he observed (in our example the Sender has informed the Receiver that s/he
observed table A). On the inferior right corner there are two buttons labelledU
and D. By clicking on the buttons U or D you take the corresponding action.
The Receiver has 20 seconds to take this decision. Once this action is taken, a
new screen appears summarizing the outcome of the round so far.
Put Figure 12 about here (caption: none). The corresponding graphic file is
called figure5.eps and should be scaled down to 74.5%.
Now the Receiver is asked to take the second decision: S/He must either ac-
cept the current payoff distribution or reduce the payoff of both participants
to zero. By clicking on the button Reduce Payoffs or Accept Payoffs, the
Receiver takes the corresponding action. The Receiver has 15 seconds to take
this decision.
Summary of the Round
The final screen is a summary of the round: It indicates the actual payoff table,
the message chosen by the Sender, the actions taken by the Receiver, and the
earnings of both participants in this round. Additionally, you are also informed
about your accumulated payoff.
Put Figure 13 about here (caption: none). The corresponding graphic file is
called figure6.eps and should be scaled down to 68%.
The screen above is the Receiver’s summary. It indicates that the Sender chose
messageA whereas the Receiver took actionD and accepted the payoffs. There-
fore, the Sender gets 2 Points and the Receiver 1 Point. At the end of a round,
click on Continue. The experiment will nevertheless proceed automatically to
the next round in 10 seconds.
Payment
The Points you accumulate during the course of the session will determine your
payment in addition to the £5 show-up fee. The exchange rate Points/£ is 10p
per Point. At the end of the experiment, take your questionnaire and receipt
to the counter for payment. They will be matched to our computer printout.
Once you are paid, you may leave.
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Figures and Tables
Table A Sender Receiver
Action U x 1
Action D 1 x
Table B Sender Receiver
Action U 1 x
Action D x 1
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Figure 1: The Benchmark Game
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Figure 2: Senders’ Behavior (x=2, Benchmark)
Histogram Receiver (x=2, Benchmark)
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Figure 3: Receivers’ Behavior (x=2, Benchmark)
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Table 2: Punishment Behavior (x = 2)
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Figure 4: Senders’ Behavior (x=2, Punishment)
Histogram Receiver (x=2, Punishment)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
# Trust
# 
Su
bje
c
ts
Receiver's Behavior over Time (x=2, Punishment)
0,000
0,500
1,000
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
Round
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
o
f T
ru
s
t
Figure 5: Receivers’ Behavior (x=2, Punishment)
Histogram Sender (x=9, Benchmark)
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Figure 6: Senders’ Behavior (x=9, Benchmark)
Histogram Receiver (x=9, Benchmark)
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Figure 7: Receivers’ Behavior (x=9, Benchmark)
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Table 3: Punishment Behavior (x = 9)
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Figure 8: Senders’ Behavior (x=9, Punishment)
Histogram Receiver (x=9, Punishment)
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Figure 9: Receiver’s Behavior (x=9, Punishment)
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